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BOOK REVIEW
BORIS I. BITTKERt
THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON AMER-
ICAN LAW. By Robert Jerome Glennon. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1985. Pp. 252. $24.95.
Legal reputations fade fast. Is Jerome N. Frank's name known
to anyone under the age of fifty, except for Yale Law students
serving in the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization? For
newcomers and oldtimers alike, Robert Jerome Glennon's biog-
raphy The Iconoclast as Reformer is a splendid assessment of a
man who brought "tremendous energy, enthusiasm, and creativity
to his work as a corporate lawyer, New Dealer, federal appeals
judge, and legal philosopher" and whose wife said that marriage
to him "is like being tied to the tail of a comet."
As its subtitle ("Jerome Frank's Impact on American Law")
suggests, Glennon's book is not an exhaustive chronological life
story, but an intellectual biography, which focuses on Frank's legal
career. In point of fact, however, Glennon manages to sketch the
salient features of Frank's personal life and to provide, at least
by assertion, a sense of his verbal exuberance. Frank was a dazzling
talker, whose metier fell between conversation and monologue;
when interrupted, he usually pursued any newly introduced theme
as though it were a logical extension of his original line of thought.
But he had no Boswell, and his oral pyrotechnics are now preserved
only in rapidly fading memories. By contrast, the paper trail-
starting with his first book, Law and the Modern Mind, and ending
with his posthumously published Not Guilty (written with his
daughter, Barbara Frank)-ean be retraced in any law library.
Law and the Modern Mind, which went through six printings
in the eighteen years following its original publication in 1930,
t Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale University; Former Law
Clerk, 1941-42, to Judge Jerome N. Frank, United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. No citations are given for the quoted phrases appearing in
this Review, on the theory that they will be of little interest to most readers;
but they are available on request from The Wayne Law Review or the author.
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established Frank as the idol-smasher of The Iconoclast as Reformer
and is a classic of American legal realism. Glennon places this
movement in a larger philosophical context-a wide-ranging revolt
against intellectual formalism-but he seems to credit Frank with
a more formative role than Frank himself claimed in developing
the theory that judges work back from conclusions to principles,
rationalizing their decisions "by finding facts and selecting rules
that justify the desired conclusion" in order to preserve the "basic
legal myth" that law is a consistent body of principles that can
be predictably applied to human controversies.
To be sure, Frank espoused a theory of unfettered judicial
discretion (at least in his jurisprudential persona), but Law and
the Modern Mind treats the idea as already validated by the writings
of others, and devotes itself to the more specialized task of
explaining the persistence in the modern world of "the ancient
dream . . . of a comprehensive and unchanging body of law."
Frank's conclusion: The dream reflects an infantile craving for
protection against the unknown, which is manifested first in the
child's confidence in an omnipotent father (as contrasted with a
"protectively tender" mother), and later in the unconscious an-
thropomorphizing of the Law ("the Father-as-Infallible-Judge").
Law and the Modern Mind couples this macro-psychic explanation
of mankind's search for unrealizable certainty in the law with a
micro-psychic explanation of judicial decision-making, in which
"the personality of the judge is the pivotal factor" and "uniquely
individual factors often are more important causes of judgments
than anything which could be described as political, economic, or
moral biases."
Frank published these speculations just after he was himself
psychoanalyzed in an effort, evidently successful, to resolve his
unconscious conflicts with his father, who had pushed him into a
legal career from which he was then deriving little satisfaction;
and the Freudian features of Law and the Modern Mind (buttressed
by ideas drawn from Piaget, Malinowski, and other social scientists)
were Frank's most distinctive contribution to the rapidly growing
legal realist movement. As Glennon demonstrates, however, Frank's
iconoclasm was almost as threatening to his fellow travellers (who
feared that emphasizing the personality and day-to-day moods of
the judge would expose them to the charge that they espoused
"gastronomic jurisprudence") as it was to his avowed opponents.
Frank gradually distanced himself from his father-substitute theory
by asserting that he had overemphasized it to stimulate thought
and by pointing to an appendix to Law and the Modern Mind,
listing fourteen of "the many possible additional explanations of
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the basic legal myth," including such tersely worded factors as
"the ecomomic interpretation," "imitation," and "inertia." Not
surprisingly, however, readers of Law and the Modern Mind paid
little attention to this one-page qualification on the book's dramatic
socio-psychic anthropology.
Turning from Frank's early iconoclasm to his life-long devotion
to law reform, Glennon assesses the influence of legal realism on
Frank's work as a New Deal lawyer. In brief, Glennon concludes
that Frank and the many other legal realists who flocked to
Washington in the early 1930s "used the flexibility and creativity
inherent in their philosophic approach to wrestle with and subdue
monumental economic and legal obstacles." (So far as economic
problems were concerned, "attempt to subdue" might be more
accurate; the unemployment rate, for example, was far higher in
President Roosevelt's best peacetime year than in President Re-
agan's worst year.) Glennon makes a persuasive case for the
liberating effect of legal realism on important aspects of New Deal
lawyering, particularly its willingness to impose legal restrictions
on business practices previously regarded as immune to federal
regulation.
On the other hand, when federal judges watered down or
refused to enforce the regulations and orders of New Deal agencies,
they were denounced by President Roosevelt and his lawyers for
exercising unwarranted judicial discretion instead of following the
law as (newly) laid down, as though judicial law-making were a
previously unknown phenomenon. Were these denunciations just
part of the rhetorical arsenal of any well-equipped hired gun, or
did the New Deal's realists really believe that their laws left no
room for legitimate judicial discretion? Was their indignation
righteous, or self-righteous? Perhaps judgmental adjectives are
inappropriate; it is at least arguable that legal realism is the
jurisprudence of rebellious underdogs, who must leave it behind
'if they join (or become) the Establishment, lest they fmd themselves
hopelessly at war with themselves.
Glennon's pioneering work may inspire others to examine in
greater detail the impact of their legal realist oackgrounds on New
Deal lawyers, as they moved from their outside perches as critics
to their new roles as inside activists. As Glennon notes, they
believed that "administrative agencies serve a public purpose by
placing a coterie of neutral experts in authority"-a faith shared
by Frank, which led him as judge "to construe New Deal legislation
broadly, and [to defer] to the judgment and findings of fact of
administrative agencies." In promoting this concept of adminis-
trative neutrality, did the New Deal legal realists .(subconsciously,
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and perhaps even to themselves) remystify the law that they had
previously tried to demystify?
Similar questions can be asked about the New Deal legal realists
who became judges. Glennon says of Frank that "[a]lthough his
jurisprudential writing depicted judges as having nearly unfettered
discretion, his judicial position demanded that he abide by the
customary rules of play." But how does a newly enrobed judge
"abide by the customary rules of play" if, as a legal realist, he
thinks that the law almost always offers a choice among conflicting
rules, that legal principles serve to rationalize results reached on
other grounds, and that judges have routinely perpetuated the
"basic legal myth" that the law is consistent, predictable, and
unaffected by judicial temperament? On ascending the bench,
should the legal realist dutifully assume, or vigorously reject, the
role of Father-as-Infallible-Judge?
Glennon traces Frank's judicial career in three fascinating
chapters, which are too rich to be briefly summarized. One can
say, however, that it is easier-much easier-to find Frank the
Reformer in Glennon's chronicle than Frank the Iconoclast. Frank
often nudged the law along in the direction he thought it should
take, but Glennon shows that if this entailed disagreement with a
conflicting principle or precedent, Frank always subjected it to an
intensive analysis bearing all the earmarks of a genuine intellectual
struggle. Moreover, Frank the reformer was always more com-
fortable in these forays if he could satisfy himself that he was
moving with the tide. Finally, in some notable cases, he shelved
his own passionate convictions, applied a conventional legal prin-
ciple that he thought wrong, and appealed to the Supreme Court
to initiate the change he favored but could not, he thought, properly
put into force.
Thus, if Frank the Iconoclast had combed his own judicial
opinions for examples to illustrate Law and the Modern Mind, he
would have found little that explicitly supports its portrayal of
judges as free agents routinely exercising unbridled discretion.
Indeed, as Glennon's account makes clear, some of Frank's most
impassioned reformist crusades involved legal principles that Frank
the Iconoclast would surely have derided as empty vessels, used
only to rationalize results reached on other grounds. One example
is his repeated denunciation of his colleagues' reliance, when
upholding criminal convictions, on the "harmless error" doctrine,
providing that appeals should be decided on "an examination of
the entire record before the court, without regard to technical
errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties." As Glennon notes, Frank "broadly supported
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an ideological position that insisted on reexamining old concepts
in order to produce a more just legal order"-a reformist position
implying that the revised concepts are more than figleaves to
rationalize results reached on other grounds. Indeed, as a judge,
Frank enthusiastically embraced some vague legal abstractions and
with equal passion rejected others-all on the unarticulated major
premise that legal principles and concepts are ex ante operational
forces rather than ex post embroidery.
To be sure, in an early exchange with Felix Frankfurter, Frank
wrote that, as a practicing lawyer, he found that "one must use
the particular kind of jargon ... that, so far as one can conjecture,
will be most pleasing to the particular tribunal to which the
argument is addressed" and that ad hominem appeals to judges
"must in most cases be artfully concealed and take on the guise
of traditional judicial cant." This suggests that Frank might have
employed the same technique in his later judicial incarnation when
appealing to a different (but presumably equally vulnerable) au-
dience; but Glennon assumes (rightly, I am confident) that Frank's
judicial crusades were untinctured by guile and that his rhetoric
came from the heart. As a practicing lawyer, Frank may have
been able to persuade others without having first persuaded himself;
but I doubt that in his later years he was capable of such a
suspension of personal belief. Indeed, I suspect that the reference
to "artfully concealed ... cant" was inspired as much by delight
in baiting Frankfurter as by cynicism; and I would not be surprised
if Frank, when in practice, succumbed to the normally irrestible
impulse of practicing lawyers to believe that they are usually on
the side of the angels, though I know of no testimony from his
partners or associates on this point.
Glennon's searching review of Frank's judicial opinions shows
not only that his doctrinal crusades are difficult to square with
the iconoclasm of Law and the Modem Mind, but also that his
deeply felt narrative accounts of the facts of particular cases belie
the skeptical view of the fact-finding process expounded in his
Courts on Trial, an early chapter of which is entitled "Facts Are
Guesses." It is easy to understand that as an appellate judge,
given his allegiance to judicial conventions, Frank ordinarily ac-
cepted the facts as found by the trial court. The fact-skepticism
espoused by Courts On Trial, however, suggests that he should
have routinely added a disclaimer-for example: "Assuming ar-
guendo that the facts as found by the trial judge correspond to
reality, a dubious assumption, then a grave injustice has been
committed." Not surprisingly, Frank as Reformer rarely if ever
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diluted the persuasive force of "the facts" by likening them to
"guesses."
These observations, stimulated by Glennon's absorbing book,
may suggest that it could have been entitled "The Case of the
Disappearing Iconoclast." That would be too neat a label, however,
because it would disregard three features of Frank's iconoclasm
that, in my opinion, deserve more emphasis than they have received.
First, both Law and the Modern Mind and Courts on Trial are
the product of Frank's unfettered exuberance, pleasure in pro-
pounding arresting ideas, and conviction that one must overstate
to get attention-temperamental proclivities that, to the delight of
his companions, were unleashed when he held forth on abstract
issues, but that existed side-by-side with a pragmatic and even
cautious approach to concrete cases. However revolutionary his
generalizations, Frank was no Lenin, nor even a Kerensky. Second,
not only does Frank's brand of legal realism bear the hallmark
of his personality, but legal realism itself was a product of a time
and a place. Viewed sub specie aeternitatis, Frank and his com-
panions may seem to invest the judge with the discretion of a
legislator, social philosopher, or dictator. Seen close up, however,
they were reacting against what Frank called "legal fundamental-
ism"-the idea that law is "a homogeneous, scientific, and all-
embracing body of principle" that is discovered by judges, not
made by them. Despite all the talk of "unfettered judicial discre-
tion," most legal realists accepted as appropriate the disciplined
judicial role described by Cardozo: "We [Le. judges] must keep
within those interstitial limits which precedent and custom and the
long and silent and almost indefinable practice of other judges
through the centuries of the common law have set to judge-made
innovations." This from the jurist whom Frank extolled as second
only to Holmes "in making possible realistic thinking about law."
One could say of Cardozo's liberated judges what Roy Campbell
said in his poem On Some South African Novelists-"They use
the snaffle and the curb all right, But where's the bloody horse?"
When the legal realists spoke of "unbridled judicial discretion,"
perhaps they should have been asked to answer the question:
"Unbridled compared with what?" Third, the legal realists grew
up in a legal era that was still dominated by the common law,
which they saw not only as ineluctably malleable, but as acceptable
primarily if not solely because it was malleable. As legal theorists,
they never came to grips with the "orgy of statute making" (Grant
Gilmore's phrase) that has come to characterize our legal culture,
since they were too busy in Washington. Orgiasts do not think,
they act. Many of them were responsible, to quote Gilmore again,
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for "a style of drafting which aimed at an uneartWy and super-
human precision" and that, one might add, was intended to leave
few of the "interstices" that Cardozo saw as the principal targets of
opportunity for the creative judge.
No doubt I have already intruded my own views too much
into this Review, but I hope the reader will excuse a few more
personal comments, addressed to Glennon's indictment of Frank
for "running for cover" during the cold war. The main foundation
for this charge, which however peripheral to the main questions
examined in Glennon's book may be picked up by others, is a
1983 account by Arthur Kinoy of his last-minute effort to persuade
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to grant Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg a stay of execution just a day after the Supreme
Court, sitting in a special session, had dissolved a stay granted by
Justice Douglas. According to Kinoy, Judge Swan said that he
would convene a three judge panel and would "vote for the stay"
if Kinoy could get one other member of the court to agree to sit
on the panel and to consider granting the stay. Kinoy and two
associates then called on Judge Frank, who is quoted by Kinoy
as saying: "If I were as young as you are, I would be sitting
where you are now and saying and arguing what you are arguing.
You are right to do so. But when you are as old as I am, you
will understand why I . . . why I cannot do what you ask. I cannot
do it." Although Kinoy interprets Frank's "when you are as old
as I am" remark as meaning that "to preserve our position in
society, we must compromise with those in control," Glennon says
that "Frank's performance confirms the institutional limits on his
intermediate-court position," since Kinoy's legal theory "tracked
the argument the full Supreme Court [had] found unpersuasive"
on the previous day. But then Glennon goes on to ask "how can
one explain Judge Swan's apparent willingness to grant the staYr?"
and "why did Jerome Frank reach the opposite conc1usiop.?"-
questions that he implicitly answers by saying that Frank "turned
a deaf ear to the Rosenbergs' plea" and ran "for cover." Let me
respond to the first question. I have known many judges in the
nearly fifty years since I entered law school, and I can think of
none who would be less likely than Judge Swan-meticulous,
reserved, cautious Thomas E. Swan-to inform counsel that he
would "vote for the stay" before convening the very judicial panel
that was to hear the argument, let alone before he even knew
whether a panel could be convened. (In fact, the requisite three
judges could not be assembled because Judge Clark, who was also
in New Haven on that fateful day, refused to sit.) Kinoy was
obviously working at fever-pitch during those last hours before
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the scheduled execution; his own account applies to himself such
terms as "fear and trepidation," "stunned," and "half-dazed."
Enveloped in emotional turmoil, he could easily have found more
encouragement in Judge Swan's words than Swan intended. More-
over, it is worth noting that in their book, We Are Your Sons
(published eight years before Kinoy published his account of the
New Haven episode), the two sons of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg
make no mention of Judge Swan's alleged willingness to vote for
the stay, although they based their report on discussions with
Kinoy's two associates in the New Haven events and had every
reason to use any such statement by Judge Swan to discredit Judge
Frank, whom their father had previously castigated for "legal
chicanery" and worse in sustaining his and his wife's conviction.
In passing judgment on Frank, Glennon may also have relied on
the report in Weinstein's Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case (cited
by Glennon) that Frank "refused to provide character references"
for Hiss (who had worked for Frank in early New Deal days), in
response to a written request by William L. Marbury. Marbury
represented Hiss in his abortive libel action against Whitaker
Chambers but has written that "my role became a very subsidiary
one" once Hiss was indicted-a point he confirmed to me in a
recent telephone conversation. But Weinstein's report is not the
whole story. Frank told me that he was interviewed in person by
lawyers representing Hiss (presumably later than the Marbury
correspondence); that he told them that he found it difficult to
believe the charges against Hiss because he regarded Hiss as a
careerist who would not have been willing to jeopardize his profes-
sional future by engaging in undercover activities for an unpopular
cause; that he was willing to appear as a character witness at
Hiss's trial; but that if questioned on cross-examination about a
much-publicized event involving his relations with Hiss in the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (A.A.A.), he would have
to say that he believed at that time and told others that he believed
that Hiss had acted dishonorably. Not surprisingly, Frank was not
called. His warning to Hiss's lawyers was well-founded, however,
since Justice Frankfurter, who appeared as a character witness in
Hiss's first trial, was asked whether Frank had complained to him
about Hiss's role in the A.A.A. event. Frankfurter, unlike Frank,
was able to testify that his recollection of the event was vague.
Frankfuter did not appear as a character witness in Hiss's second
trial.
Frank's papers in the Yale University Archives contain a tran-
script of Justice Frankfurter's testimony, along with a five page
memorandum in Frank's handwriting, summarizing (evidently for
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himself but perhaps also in preparation for a discussion with Hiss's
lawyers) his relations with Hiss, which refers to facts making Hiss
"to me, seem lacking in integrity" and concluding with the tan-
talizing unanswered question: "If asked, as a witness, what I think
of his reputation/character, what should I say?"
